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ABSTRACT
Background Medication-related decision support can
reduce the frequency of preventable adverse drug
events. However, the design of current medication alerts
often results in alert fatigue and high over-ride rates,
thus reducing any potential benefits.
Methods The authors previously reviewed human-
factors principles for relevance to medication-related
decision support alerts. In this study, instrument items
were developed for assessing the appropriate
implementation of these human-factors principles in
drugedrug interaction (DDI) alerts. User feedback
regarding nine electronic medical records was
considered during the development process. Content
validity, construct validity through correlation analysis,
and inter-rater reliability were assessed.
Results The final version of the instrument included
26 items associated with nine human-factors
principles. Content validation on three systems
resulted in the addition of one principle (Corrective
Actions) to the instrument and the elimination of
eight items. Additionally, the wording of eight items
was altered. Correlation analysis suggests
a direct relationship between system age and
performance of DDI alerts (p¼0.0016). Inter-rater
reliability indicated substantial agreement between
raters (k¼0.764).
Conclusion The authors developed and gathered
preliminary evidence for the validity of an instrument that
measures the appropriate use of human-factors
principles in the design and display of DDI alerts.
Designers of DDI alerts may use the instrument to
improve usability and increase user acceptance of
medication alerts, and organizations selecting an
electronic medical record may find the instrument helpful
in meeting their clinicians’ usability needs.
INTRODUCTION
Clinical decision support (CDS) can assist providers
in effectively managing patient care. Kuperman
et al describe medication-related decision support as
a type of CDS which offers clinicians guidance
for appropriate prescribing in several areas
including: drugeallergy checking; dosing guidance;
formulary decision support; duplicate therapy
checking; drugedrug interaction (DDI) checking;
medication-associated laboratory testing; checking
of drugedisease interactions and contraindications;
and advanced drugepregnancy alerting.1 Such
guidance can be provided to users through either
interruptive alerts or non-interruptive reminders.
When implemented appropriately and accepted
by users for prescribing guidance, medication-
related decision support can reduce adverse-drug-
event (ADE) rates.2e5 Bates et al found that the rate
of preventable ADEs decreased from 2.9/1000
patient-days in the absence of medication-related
decision support and computerized physician order
entry to 1.1/1000 patient-days in the presence of
medication-related decision support used in
conjunction with computerized physician order
entry.6 In a study by Weingart et al, an expert panel
was convened to evaluate the extent to which
patient harm was avoided through the use of
medication-related decision support and DDI alerts.
Of the 402 avoided ADEs, 12.2% were serious,
31.1% were signiﬁcant, and 56.7% were minor.5
While these results support the positive effects
of medication-related decision support on patient
safety, it has yet to realize its full potential.
This is mainly due to the poor acceptance of
warnings among users, as 50% to 95% of drug
safety warnings are over-ridden.7
Several approaches have been applied to increase
alert acceptance. As preliminary steps, van der Sijs
et al suggest that the number of inappropriate alerts
should be reduced and that alerts should be selec-
tively delivered to the appropriate provider. Subse-
quent steps should address the sensitivity,
usefulness, and usability of alerts.7 Shah et al
modiﬁed a commercial knowledge base to reﬂect
only the most clinically relevant and up-to-date
knowledge responsible for triggering DDI alerts,
and they decreased the number of interruptive
alerts by 71%. Excluding alerts of the highest
severity that were implemented as hard-stops, the
remaining interruptive alerts resulted in the
cancelation (19%) and modiﬁcation (48%) of orders,
indicating a 67% alert acceptance rate.8 Modifying
or canceling the intended order is deﬁned as an
acceptance of alert logic, while continuing with an
order unchanged after receiving an alert is deﬁned
as an over-riding of the alert. In addition to
the above-mentioned methods for decreasing
alert fatigue, usability and human-factors concepts
that facilitate the appropriate use of visual and
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text-based information within alerts should be utilized for
efﬁcient cognitive processing by the user.9
While human factors have been well studied in the general
safety literature, few studies have addressed human factors and
the design of clinical information systems empirically. In
a viewpoint paper, Karsh et al stressed the importance of
drawing on human-factors engineering to improve the usability
of health information technology, calling for such research in the
domain of patient safety.9 Since information presentation
affects user behavior and decision-making, information archi-
tecture and graphic interface design demand careful consider-
ation. Design details such as navigation from one window to the
next, information placement, font size, information similarity,
and perceived credibility can signiﬁcantly affect the user ’s
actions. Saleem et al afﬁrm that the user interface stands
between clinical information systems and the expected outcome
of enhanced patient safety.10 Improving the design of the
humanecomputer interface through the application of human-
factors engineering has the potential to enable users to optimally
utilize these systems.
The current literature provides little in the way of tools for
assessing the compliance of medication alert design interfaces
with commonly employed human-factors principles. In a recent
study, Phansalkar et al identiﬁed 11 key human-factors principles
that should be considered when designing medication-related
decision support alerts.11 In the current study, we combined
these to build the Instrument for Evaluating Human-Factors
Principles in Medication-Related Decision Support Alerts
(I-MeDeSA) in order to assess the extent to which a given
interface design incorporates these human-factors principles. We
then gathered preliminary evidence for the validity of the
instrument by testing it on three medication-related decision-
support systems. This paper discusses the results of the devel-
opment and preliminary validation of I-MeDeSA, an instrument
created for system developers to improve alert design and to
inform an organization’s purchase of a usable electronic medical
record (EMR) system.
BACKGROUND
Phansalkar et al identiﬁed key human-factors principles for the
design and implementation of medication-related decision
support alerts.11 Eleven principles were determined to be
important: Alarm Philosophy, False Alarms, Placement, Visi-
bility, Prioritization, Color, Learnability and Confusability,
Textual Information, Habituation, Mental Models, and
Proximity of Task Components Being Displayed (table 1).
METHODS
Literature review
A systematic review of the medical informatics literature was
conducted to identify any instruments available for quantita-
tively measuring compliance of clinical information systems
with human-factors principles. The PubMed/Medline database
was searched for articles published from July 2000 to July 2010.
The query consisted of the following criteria: terms related to
clinical information systems (medical records system, medical order
entry systems, computerized physician order entry) along with terms
related to human-factors principles (human-factors engineering,
humaneinterface interactions, usability), and terms related to
instruments (survey, survey method, questionnaire). The search was
restricted to Meta-Analyses, Practice Guidelines, Randomized-
Controlled Trials, or Reviews that were published with abstracts
and in English. The search strategy is outlined in ﬁgure 1.
The query combining all three search criteria described above
returned 159 articles. All abstracts were reviewed by one
reviewer (MZ), and 29 articles were selected based on their
relevance to the employment of human-factors principles in the
design of clinical information systems. One article from
a bibliographical search of the selected 29 articles was added.
Two reviewers (MZ, SP) independently evaluated the 30 articles
to assess whether any of the studies employed an instrument for
measuring compliance with human-factors principles in clinical
information systems design. Reviewers were unable to identify
the existence of such an instrument in the existing literature.
Instrument development
In this study, we developed an instrument to measure the
implementation of human-factors principles in the design of
medication-related decision support relating to DDI alerts. DDI
alerts where chosen to be the focus, since they are one of the
most commonly triggered alerts in medication-related decision-
support systems. For this purpose, quantiﬁable human-factors
principles as outlined in the previous study by Phansalkar et al
were compiled, and we created several items for use in assessing
these principles. This preliminary version of the instrument was
improved and adapted iteratively. First, the instrument was
distributed for content validation to three reviewers (KC, PN,
and HS) with expertise in the use of human-factors principles
for the evaluation of clinical information systems. These experts
were asked to review the items for relevance and clarity. Items
were eliminated or modiﬁed based on feedback received from the
three reviewers.
To assess the generalizability of the items to DDI alerts of
various designs across different EMR systems, three reviewers
(JD, HS, MZ) tested the instrument on DDI alerts generated in
EMRs used at their own organizations (ie, (i) Gopher 5.25, an
ambulatory EMR used at Regenstrief Institute, Indianapolis,
Indiana; (ii) AiDKlinik 1.9.2, a prescribing platform integrated
into an ambulatory EMR used at Heidelberg University
Hospital, Heidelberg, Germany; and (iii) the Longitudinal
Medical Record (LMR) 8.2, an ambulatory EMR used at Partners
Healthcare, Boston, Massachusetts). While I-MeDeSA was
tested exclusively on outpatient EMRs, the instrument is also
applicable to inpatient EMRs, as indicated by a related study
that uses the instrument to evaluate the usability of DDI alerts
from various inpatient and outpatient EMRs used across the
USA.16 From this study, the authors have observed that the
design of inpatient versus outpatient DDI alerts for vendor or
home-grown products is similar, and the inclusion of DDI alerts
from inpatient decision-support systems would likely result in
similar ﬁndings.
Reviewers evaluated each unique design of DDI alerts
displayed in their organizations’ systems. To facilitate the eval-
uation, reviewers were given exemplar DDIs that were expected
to trigger alerts of various levels of severity. They were selected
from the drug knowledge database at Partners Healthcare in fall,
2010. The speciﬁc DDIs that were provided to the reviewers to
examine in their respective systems are presented in table 2.
If these DDIs failed to trigger an alert, reviewers were
instructed to use alternate DDIs relevant to their systems in
order to capture all severity levels of alerts. Both AiDKlinik and
Gopher required alternate and unique DDIs to trigger alerts of
various levels available in each system. Feedback from this
assessment was used to modify the items so they would be
applicable to various DDI alert designs across EMRs.
Next, we assessed inter-rater reliability and construct validity
through correlation analysis. Inter-rater reliability was assessed
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using Cohen’s k. Two reviewers (JD, HS) independently evalu-
ated the same DDI alerts from Gopher 5.25. A preliminary
evaluation for construct validity was performed by correlating
the performance of DDI alerts on I-MeDeSA to the age of the
medication decision-support system from which the alerts came.
Given that the usability of medication decision support alerts has
gained attention only in recent years, we hypothesized that older
systems would perform more poorly than newer systems when
DDI alerts are evaluated by I-MeDeSA. DDI alerts from LMR
(2010) and Gopher (1993) were compared in order to establish
a correlation between system age and performance on I-MeDeSA.
The scores used for this analysis were the ﬁnal scores assigned to
these systems, as agreed upon by two reviewers (HS, MZ).
The ﬁnal version of I-MeDeSA incorporated changes made as
a result of the above methods for analysis, as well as results from
a related study that collected user feedback about various EMRs
employed by multiple institutions across the USA.17 User
feedback was used to provide recommendations for the preferred
design of DDI alerts and medication-related decision-support
systems more generally.
Employing the I-MeDeSA instrument
The instrument has been created for assessment of medication-
related decision support alert design. Some medication-related
decision-support systems stratify medication alerts based on the
severity of patient harm.18 If the system possesses alerts of
various severities, and the designs of these stratiﬁed alerts are
unique, each design would require evaluation, and scores within
each item would be averaged. If the design of stratiﬁed alerts is
the same, or alerts are not stratiﬁed, then the user would need to
assess only a single design. Each item scores on a binary basis,
where a score of 0 is equivalent to answering ‘No’ for the absence
of the characteristic, and a score of 1 is equivalent to answering
‘Yes’ for its presence. Pilot testing showed that the instrument
required approximately 20 min to complete per system.
RESULTS
Eight of the 11 human-factors principles outlined in the Phan-
salkar et al review were selected for incorporation into the
instrument because they were quantiﬁable. Three principles
(False Alarms, Habituation, and Mental Models) were excluded
Table 1 Summary of the 11 key human-factors principles for use in medication-related decision-support alerts, compiled by Phansalkar et al11
Human-factors principle Summary of principle
Alarm philosophy Defined as the logic used to classify alert priority levels. A catalog of all alert level categories should be made available to users, clearly
indicating how priority levels are set (eg, based on the severity of patient harm). The goal of this philosophy should be to minimize the overall
number of alerts. Additionally, the alert should seek to capture the user’s acknowledgment and response. Ideally, the user’s acceptance or
rejection of the alert would also serve as an acknowledgment of having seen the alert. Less desirable would be alert designs in which these
functions are separated, and users would need to first acknowledge an alert and subsequently indicate their response in a separate window.
False alarms May arise when the alert logic is incorrect or out of date, or the alert is calibrated too sensitively, setting off alarms that are essentially irrelevant
to clinical care. False alarms may disrupt workflow and unnecessarily increase workload. Evidence suggests that users will decrease their
response to alerts in general as the false-alarm rate increases.12 13 Recommendations are to move away from alarm strategies that follow
a one-size-fits-all approach and toward intelligent alarm monitoring that considers the multi-dimensional relationship between clinical
interactions and patient health.
Placement Alerts and the information within should take into consideration users’ viewing habits to optimize visibility. Alerts should be located in the visual
field in order of their importance. Additionally, the proximity compatibility principle of Wickens and Carswell14 should be employeddfor
example, as a user orders medications, alerts should appear in close proximity to the location on the screen where a user enters medications in
the ordering window.
Visibility Considers overall size of the alert on the screen (target size), luminance, background contrast, and lettering characteristics. The size of the target
should be increased as viewing distance increases or contrast decreases. Additionally, letter heights should be larger when reading from
a visual display; a mixture of upper and lower cases should be used for easier reading; and visibility is optimized when dark text is presented on
a light background.
Prioritization Prioritization of alerts through visual characteristics is necessary and should utilize hazard matching. This is the process of matching the
appearance of the warning to the level of hazard associated with the clinical implications of the alert. For example, colors such as red and
orange typically imply a higher level of hazard, while green, blue, and white imply a lower hazard level. It is also important to consider the
limitations of color for indicating the level of hazard for color-blind users. To address color-blind users’ needs, signal words and shapes can be
used to communicate the level of hazard and priority in addition to the use of color. Signal words demonstrating high priority are: ‘lethal,’
‘deadly,’ ‘danger;’ and words demonstrating low priority are: ‘warning,’ ‘caution,’ etc. Shapes can also be used for conveying levels of priority:
angular shapes represent high priority while regular shapes such as circles represent low priority.15
Color May be utilized not only to indicate severity but also to communicate the type of alert (eg, drugedrug, drugeallergy, etc) or the response
required. However, colors should be kept to a minimum (<10), since, with more colors, it may be difficult for users to remember what each
color indicates.
Learnability and confusability Refers to the ability of the user to learn and distinguish between different types of visual alerts. Color, shapes, and size can be used to lend
a distinct appearance to different types of alerts. The fewer features that alerts share with each other, the more distinct they appear, making it
easier for users to remember and quickly recognize different types of alerts.
Textual information Demands as much consideration in the designing of medication-related decision support alerts as the alerts’ visual characteristics. The text of
visual alerts should possess the following four components for effective communication of information: (1) a signal word to indicate the severity
of the alert, (2) a statement of the nature of the hazard (eg, specify interacting drug names or drug classes), (3) an instruction statement
providing recommended actions, and (4) a consequence statement that indicates the potential harm to the patient. Of these four components,
the nature of the hazard and instruction statements carry the most importance. Additionally, textual information should be explicit, rather than
non-explicit (eg, ‘smoking causes lung cancer’ rather than ‘smoking is damaging to health’).
Habituation Refers to a decrease in response to stimulus due to repeated and inconsequential exposure. Habituation predicts that repeated exposure to an
alert that does not require that a meaningful response will result in a decrease, and eventual elimination, of responding to the alert. This risk
highlights the importance of reducing the rate of false alarms, as well as the importance of an alarm philosophy that minimizes alerts overall.
Habituation also highlights the importance of different types of alerts being visually distinct from one another, since alerts that are not visually
distinct can be perceived as the same.
Mental model Represents the understanding individuals have about a particular topic. Given that mental models govern users’ behavior, alerting systems
should adequately support pervading mental models. For example, since users generally perceive red to mean ‘stop’ and green to mean ‘go,’
alerting systems should follow the same model, rather than using green to signal ‘stop’ and red to signal ‘go.’
Proximity of task
components being displayed
Incorporates Wickens and Carswell’s proximity compatibility principle,14 as does the Placement principle. With respect to Proximity of Task
Components Being Displayed, tools for decision-making should be integrated into the body of the alert or found within close temporal and spatial
proximity to the alert. For example, a link to a medical reference website should be located within the alert, not in a window that is multiple
clicks away.
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due to their less quantiﬁable nature given typical sources of data
available, even though these principles may be important for
determining user acceptance. Therefore, the initial instrument
contained eight principles and 34 allocated items. During the
development of I-MeDeSA, the instrument was assessed for
content validity and inter-rater reliability, and a preliminary
evaluation of construct validity was performed. In testing
I-MeDeSA on DDI alerts from three unique EMRs, one new
human-factors principle was created (Corrective Actions), and
eight items across multiple principles were eliminated, resulting
in nine principles and 26 items. The formal instrument is
available upon request. Detailed information on validation is
described below.
Validation
Upon completing the original draft of I-MeDeSA, the instru-
ment was distributed to reviewers (KC, PN, and HS) with
expertise in the use of human factors to assess its content
validity. After receiving their feedback, changes were made to
each principle. Content validation is summarized in table 3. We
have also provided a detailed explanation of the Corrective Actions
principle, since it has not been previously described in the
Phansalkar et al study.11
Corrective actions
Use of this principle serves to streamline the user ’s workﬂow in
responding to alerts. The goal is to minimize the number of
steps the user must take in dealing with an alert, as well as to
efﬁciently capture the user ’s response to the alert, or intended
action. Typically, a user will receive a DDI alert after attempting
to place an order for a drug that interacts with an existing drug.
As a next step, the user would process the nature of the inter-
action and weigh the risks and beneﬁts to the patient of
continuing with the order or canceling it. At this point, the user
usually acknowledges having gone through the assessment
process, indicates an acceptance or rejection of the alert, and
proceeds with the intended action. The actions may be: to
continue with the order unadjusted, to continue with the order
but adjust the dose of one of the drugs, to continue with the
order but switch to a different drug within the same class, to
discontinue an existing drug and place the order for the new
drug, or to cancel the order for the new drug and keep the
existing drug. Systems considering human-factors principles and
usability will provide the user with an efﬁcient means for
carrying out any of the steps described for dealing with an alert.
The items within the Corrective Actions principle capture the use
of such efﬁcient methods. The ﬁrst item assesses the use of
a simplistic corrective action. Through one click located within
the alert, the user is able to simultaneously acknowledge having
seen an alert, as well as convey an acceptance or rejection of the
alert with respect to their patient. Given the volume of alerts
received by clinicians each day and feedback received from users
in a related study,17 the employment of a simplistic method for
responding to the alert will increase the usability and efﬁciency
of alerts.
More sophisticated systems will provide intelligent corrective
actions within the alert. The second item within this principle
relates to the interruptive nature of alerts and the fallibility of
humans. Intelligent corrective actions address these issues by
assisting the user in efﬁciently accepting or rejecting an alert and
carrying out recommended actions. For example, an alert may
read, ‘Reduce the warfarin dose by 33e50% and follow patient
closely.’ An alert using intelligent corrective actions would
contain a response such as, ‘Continue with warfarin order AND
reduce dose by 33e50%.’ Selecting this option would simulta-
neously accept the alert and direct the user back to the medi-
cation ordering window where the user can adjust the dose
appropriately. In addition to automatically linking the user to
the ordering screen for adjusting a dose, the system would be
Figure 1 Search criteria and results. (A) (Ambulatory Care Information
Systems OR Computerized Order Entry OR Computerized Physician Order
Entry OR Computerized Prescriber Order Entry OR Computerized Provider
Order Entry OR Decision Support Systems, Clinical OR Drug Therapy,
Computer-Assisted OR Electronic Medical Record OR Electronic Order
Entry OR Electronic Physician Order Entry OR Electronic Prescribing OR
Electronic Prescription OR Medical Order Entry Systems OR Medical
Records Systems, Computerized). (B) (Interface, User Computer OR
Interface, UsereComputer OR Interfaces, UsereComputer OR Human
Factor OR Human Factors OR Human Factors Engineering OR Human
Factors Principles OR HumaneMachine Interaction OR HumaneMachine
Interface Usability OR Interfaces, User Computer OR Usability OR User
Computer Interface OR User Computer Interfaces OR UsereComputer
Interfaces OR User Interface Design). (C) (Instrument* OR Methodology,
Survey OR Methods, Survey OR Questionnaire* OR Survey* OR Survey
Method OR Survey Methodology). (D) (Limits: Publication Types: Clinical
Trial; Meta-Analysis; Practice Guideline; Randomized Controlled Trial;
Review; Articles with Abstracts; Language: English; Publication Date
Range: July 2000eJuly 2010).
Table 2 Suggested drug interactions provided to reviews
Alert level Drugedrug interaction Expected clinical implications
1 (most severe) Dextoamphetamine and monoamine oxidase
inhibitordfor example, isocarboxazid
Patient on amphetamine and a monoamine oxidase
inhibitordincreased risk of hypertensive crisis. Concurrent use
is contraindicated. Discontinue one of these medications.
A washout period of 2 weeks is required for a monoamine oxidase inhibitor.
2 (moderately severe) Dexfenfluramine and tricyclic
antidepressantdfor example, amitriptyline
Patient on tricyclic antidepressant and dexfenfluramine. May produce
serotonin syndrome. Recommend to avoid concurrent use and to
consider an alternative agent.
3 (least severe) Omeprazole and H2 blockerdfor example, ranitidine Patient on omeprazole and H2 blocker. H2 blocker will render omeprazole
inactive. Use with caution.
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Table 3 Summary of content validation and the final list of items contained within Instrument for Evaluating Human-Factors Principles in Medication-
Related Decision Support Alerts
Human factors
principle Original items
Explanation of changes made during
content validation Final items
Alarm
philosophy
(1i) Is there a description of the logic
underpinning the classification of an event
as unsafe (eg, a catalog of unsafe events,
correlating the level of the alert with the
severity of the consequences)?
Reviewers felt Items 1i and 1ii were
redundant. Therefore, these two items
were combined to capture whether or not
alert logic was available to the user.
(1i) Does the system provide a general
catalog of unsafe events, correlating the
priority level of the alert with the severity
of the consequences?
(1ii) Is the documentation obvious or
available to the user?
(1iii) Are corrective actions available to
allow the user to acknowledge or cancel
the alert?
Items 1iiie1v pertained to design features
that assist in streamlining workflow in
responding to alerts. Reviewers felt items
relating to alert response deserved their
own principle; thus Corrective Actions
was created to reflect these items
(see Corrective Actions below).
(1iv) Is the users’ response to the alert
the appropriate corrective action and not
merely an acknowledgment of having
seen the alert?
(1v) Are the corrective actions easy to
perform?
Placement (2i) Are different types of alerts
meaningfully grouped (eg, by medication
order where all of the alerts related to
a specific medication order should be
grouped together or by type where all of
the allergy alerts are grouped together)?
Further clarification given through
provided example
(2i) Are different types of alerts
meaningfully grouped (eg, by the severity
of the alert, where all Level 1 alerts are
placed together, or by medication order,
where alerts related to a specific
medication order are grouped together)?
(2ii) Is the response to the alert located
in close proximity to the event that is,
triggering the alert?
Further clarification given through
provided example
(2ii) If available, is the response to the
alert, indicating the user’s intended action
(eg, Accept, Cancel/Over-ride), provided
along with the alert, as opposed to being
located in a different window or in
a different area on the screen?
(2iii) Is the alert linked with the
medication order by an appropriate
timing? (eg, does the alert appear
immediately after the medication is
selected?).
Further clarification given through
provided example
(2iii) Is the alert linked with the
medication order by an appropriate timing
(eg, DDI alert appears as soon as
a contraindicated drug is chosen and does
not wait for the user to complete the order
and then alert him/her on a possible
interaction)?
(2iv) Are the alerts centered on the screen
or placed in a location that allows the user
to see them easily?
This item was modified to provide an
objective guideline for judging the layout
of information contained within the alert.
Reviewers felt the subjectivity of the
original item failed to provide an objective
assessment and was too open to
interpretation.
(2iv) Does the layout of critical
information contained within the alert
facilitate quick uptake by the user? Critical
information should be placed on the first
line of the alert or closest to the left side
of the alert box. Critical information should
be labeled appropriately and must consist
of: (1) the interacting drugs, (2) the risk to
the patient, and (3) the recommended
action. (Note: information contained
within resources such as an ‘Infobutton’
or link to a drug monograph does not
equate to information contained within
the alert.)
(2v) Are the alerts placed on the screen
in the order of their importance? The
highest-priority alerts should be located
where users tend to focus most.
This item was transferred to the
Prioritization principle, since it relates to
placing the highest priority alerts in
a manner that allows them to be seen
without the user having to scroll through
the window
(2vi) Are recommended actions
immediately accessible (eg, ordering
a potassium lab when alerted for
hyperkalemia)?
This item more closely relates to
Corrective Actions and has been removed
from Placement and incorporated as the
second item in the new principle
Continued
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Table 3 Continued
Human factors
principle Original items
Explanation of changes made during
content validation Final items
Visibility (3i) Is the size of the alert message able
to draw the attention of the user?
Since responses to this item could vary
based on personal preference, the item
was altered to more objectively measure
the alert’s ability to draw attention
through the use of a variety of methods
such as borders, highlighting, etc, in
addition to size
(3i) Is the area where the alert is located
distinguishable from the rest of the
screen? This might be achieved through
the use of a different background color,
a border color, highlighting, bold
characters, occupying the majority of the
screen, etc.
(3ii) Does the background contrast allow
the user to easily read the alert message
(eg, dark text on a light background is
easier to read than light text on a dark
background)?
No significant changes made to the item (3ii) Is the background contrast sufficient
to allow the user to easily read the alert
message (eg, dark text on a light
background is easier to read than light
text on a dark background)?
(3iii) Is the font used to display the textual
message appropriate for the user to read
the alert easily (eg, a mixture of upper and
lower case lettering is easier to read than
upper case only)?
No significant changes made to the item (3iii) Is the font used to display the textual
message appropriate for the user to read
the alert easily (eg, a mixture of upper-
and lower-case lettering is easier to read
than upper case only)?
(3iv) Is there consideration given to
placing the alert so as to reduce the
screen glare and reflection, which can
diminish legibility?
Reviewers determined this item was
unrelated to the usability of alerts, so
this item has been removed
Prioritization (4i) Is the prioritization of alerts indicated
appropriately by color (eg, colors such as
red and orange imply a high priority when
compared to colors such as green, blue
and white)?
No significant changes made to the item (4i) Is the prioritization of alerts indicated
appropriately by color (eg, colors such as
red and orange imply a high priority when
compared to colors such as green, blue,
and white)?
(4ii) Does the alert use prioritization with
green and red colors which may not take
into consideration users who may be
colorblind?
This item was reworded so that
answering in the affirmative indicates
the use of this human-factors principle
(4ii) Does the alert use prioritization with
colors other than green and red, to take
into consideration users who may be
colorblind?
(4iii) Are signal words used appropriately
in the alert (eg, ‘warning’ and ‘caution’
should be used to denote medium levels
of hazard, while terms like ‘note’ or
‘notice’ are used to denote lower levels
of hazard)?
Further clarification given through the
wording of this item and the provided
example
(4iii) Are signal words appropriately
assigned to each existing level of alert
(eg, ‘Warning’ would appropriately be
assigned to a Level 1 alert and not a Level
3 alert)? ‘Note’ would appropriately be
assigned to a Level 3 alert, and not a Level
1 alert.
(4iv) Does the alert utilize shapes or icons
in order to indicate the priority of the alert
(eg, angular and unstable shapes such as
an inverted triangles indicate higher levels
of priority than regular shapes such as
circles)?
No significant changes made to the item (4iv) Does the alert utilize shapes or icons
in order to indicate the priority of the alert
(eg, angular and unstable shapes such as
inverted triangles indicate higher levels of
priority than regular shapes such as
circles)?
Originally Item 2v, this item has been
moved to the Prioritization principle.
Further clarification given through
provided example.
(4v) In the case of multiple alerts, are the
alerts placed on the screen in the order of
their importance? The highest-priority
alerts should be visible to the user without
having to scroll through the window.
Color (5i) Does the alert utilize color coding to
indicate the type of unsafe event (eg, DDI
vs allergy alert)?
No significant changes made to the item (5i) Does the alert utilize color coding to
indicate the type of unsafe event (eg, DDI
vs allergy alert)?
(5ii) Does the alert utilize color coding to
indicate the severity of risk (eg, Level 1 vs
level 2)?
This item was removed, since the notion
of conveying prioritization of the severity
of alerts through the use of color has
already been captured as Item 4i in the
Prioritization principle
(5iii) Does the alert utilize color coding to
indicate the response required (eg, a hard
stop vs an alert that you can over-ride)?
Reviewers determined that color-coding
the type of response required could be
better addressed through mechanisms
other than color. This item was removed.
(5iv) Is there excessive coloring used on
the screen (eg, colors should be kept to
fewer than 10)?
This item was reworded so that
answering in the affirmative indicates
the use of this human factors principle
(5ii) Is color minimally used to focus the
attention of the user? Excessive coloring
used on the screen can create noise and
distract the user. Therefore, colors should
be kept to fewer than 10.
(5v) Is the color used for the textual
message in the alert appropriate and
easy to read?
Reviewers removed this item, since it has
been captured in the Visibility and
Prioritization principles, Items 3iii and 4i
Continued
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Table 3 Continued
Human factors
principle Original items
Explanation of changes made during
content validation Final items
Learnability and
confusability
(6i) Do the different types of alerts look
easily distinguishable from one another?
This item has been eliminated, since it has
already been captured in the Color
principle as Item 5i in a more specific
manner.
(6ii) Do the different levels of alerts look
easily distinguishable from one another?
Further clarification given through
provided example
(6i) Are the different severities of alerts
easily distinguishable from one another?
For example, do major alerts possess
visual characteristics that are distinctly
different from minor alerts? The use of
a signal word to identify the severity of an
alert is not considered to be a visual
characteristic.
Text-based
information
(7i) Does the alert possess the following
four information components?
(7) Does the alert possess the following
four information components?
(7ia) A signal word to indicate the priority
of the alerts (eg, ‘note,’ ‘warning,’ or
‘danger’)?
No significant changes made to the item (7i) A signal word to indicate the priority
of the alert (eg, ‘note,’ ‘warning,’ or
‘danger’)?
(7ib) A statement of the nature of the
hazard describing why the alert is shown?
Further clarification given through
provided example
(7ii) A statement of the nature of the
hazard describing why the alert is shown?
This may be a generic statement in which
the interacting classes are listed, or an
explicit explanation in which the specific
drugedrug interactions are clearly
indicated.
The original Item 7iii became subitem 7iia (7iia) If yes, are the specific interacting
drugs explicitly indicated?
(7ic) An instruction statement telling the
user how to avoid the danger or the
desired action?
No significant changes made to the item (7iii) An instruction statement telling the
user how to avoid the danger or the
desired action?
The original Item 7iv became subitem 7iiia (7iiia) If yes, does the order of
recommended tasks reflect the order of
required actions?
(7id) A consequence statement telling the
user what might happen if the instruction
information is ignored?
Further clarification given through
provided example
(7iv) A consequence statement telling the
user what might happendfor example,
the reaction that may occur, if the
instruction information is ignored
(7ii) Does the consequence statement
contain definitive, rather than
probabilistic, statements?
Reviewers determined that it is not
possible to provide a definitive
consequence statement, since such
certainty cannot be applied to every
unique patient. Therefore, this item has
been eliminated.
(7iii) Does the message provide explicit
information on why the alert was
generated (eg, identifying specific drug
which caused the alert rather than only
providing the drug class)?
This item has been removed, but the
content has been captured in Item 7iia
(7iv) Does the order of words in the
recommendation reflect the order of
required actions?
This item has been removed, but the
content has been captured in Item 7iiia
Proximity of task
components being
displayed
(8i) Are the information components
required for decision-making displayed
within the alert or present close together
spatially or temporally?
Further clarification given through
provided example
(8i) Are the informational components
needed for decision-making on the alert
present either within or in close spatial
and temporal proximity to the alert? For
example, is the user able to access
relevant information directly from the
alert, that is a drug monograph, an
‘Infobutton,’ or a link to a medical
reference website providing additional
information?
Continued
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capable of automatically discontinuing an existing drug directly
from the alert, as well as replacing an order for a different drug
within the same class (and medication decision support would
re-evaluate interactions with the newly selected drug). Given
that clinicians are already juggling the care of multiple patients,
and given the nature of alerts to interrupt the user ’s workﬂow,
such intelligent corrective actions are important. The user would
not have to remember to go back into the system, after dealing
with all alerts, to follow through with intended actions. Finally,
there would ideally exist a fail-safe mechanism in which the
system is capable of monitoring whether or not the user
followed through with the intended action, the third item in
this principle. If the user did not complete intended actions, the
system would notify the user.
Instrument applicability
To ensure the applicability of the instrument to a variety of DDI
alert designs, the modiﬁed instrument was distributed to three
reviewers (JD, HS, and MZ). One reviewer had expertise in the
ﬁeld of medical informatics; another in the use of human-factors
principles; and the third with experience in the usability of CDS
systems. Reviewers tested the instrument on the DDI alerts
available in the EMRs used at their own institutions. The design
of DDI alerts was different for each system. See table 4 for
a brief description of DDI alerts from each system.
After reviewing the evaluations and associated feedback from
reviewers, the following guidelines for scoring the instrument
items were established to maximize applicability to different
systems:
Critical Information Layout (Item 2iv): The primary focus of
this item is on the layout of the information presented within
the alert. Critical information provided in a DDI alert must
include: (1) the interacting drugs, (2) the risk to the patient, and
(3) the recommended action. Each component should be labeled
appropriately and located on a few lines each, at the ﬁrst point
of alerting. The information should not be presented together in
one paragraph. If any of the critical information components
require the user to click through additional screens or to sort
through a drug monograph to access this information, this
critical information layout item will be scored as zero. Systems
will score higher if they use active alerts that force users to see
alert information, rather than passive alerts where the user must
seek out alert information through multiple clicks, effectively
allowing the user to avoid the information entirely.
Visibility (Item 3iii): Any mixture of upper and lower case shall
be scored as 1; exclusive use of either upper or lower case shall be
scored as 0.
Distinguishing Alert Features (Item 6i): To achieve a score of 1,
alerts must possess unique visual characteristics, such as color,
shapes, and font. The use of a signal word to identify the
severity of the alert is not considered to be a visual characteristic.
Text-Based Information (Items 7ie7iv): These items evaluate
the textual information presented at the ﬁrst point of alerting.
Any information contained within expanded details or a mono-
graph shall be disregarded. If the user is initially presented with
only one component of an alert, for example, only the type or
severity, and they must click through additional windows or
read through a monograph to acquire the required information,
the corresponding items shall be scored as 0.
Corrective Actions (Item 9ia): If there is at least one corrective
action presented in the alert, such as ‘discontinue existing drug,’
this item shall receive a score of 1.
The patient safety literature has indicated the importance of
providing users with information on how alert severities are
Table 3 Continued
Human factors
principle Original items
Explanation of changes made during
content validation Final items
Corrective
actions
The original Items 1iii and 1iv from Alarm
Philosophy were combined to form the
first item in the Corrective Actions
principle
(9i) Does the system possess corrective
actions that serve as an acknowledgment
of having seen the alert while
simultaneously capturing the user’s
intended action? For example, ‘Accept’
and ‘Cancel’/‘Over-ride’ are corrective
actions that convey the user’s acceptance
or rejection of alert logic, while ‘OK’ is
only an acknowledgment of the user
having seen the alert.
The original Item 1v from Alarm
Philosophy became Item 9ia. It has also
been worded more clearly, and an
example has been provided.
(9ia) If yes, does the alert utilize intelligent
corrective actions that allow the user to
complete a task? For example, if warfarin
and ketoconazole are co-prescribed, the
alert may ask the user to ‘Reduce the
warfarin dose by 33e50% and follow the
patient closely.’ An intelligent corrective
action would be ‘Continue with warfarin
order AND reduce dose by 33e50%.’
Selecting this option would
simultaneously accept the alert AND
direct the user back to the medication
ordering window where the user can
adjust the dose appropriately.
Based on information gathered from
a related study,17 reviewers created this
last item
(9ii) Is the system able to monitor and
alert the user to follow through with
corrective actions? Referring to the
previous example, if the user tells the
system that he/she will reduce the
warfarin dose but fails to follow through
on that promise, does the system alert the
user?
DDI, drugedrug interaction.
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assessed and the general ‘alert philosophy ’ of the system. The
absence of such information existed across systems, creating
a lack of transparency for users to assess severity ratings, the
number of levels of alerts, and general information. Users have
expressed the desire for such a catalog in order to increase DDI
alert usability.17 Therefore, authors felt the presence of item 1i
was an important criterion to include.
Inter-rater reliability
Two reviewers (JD, HS) independently applied I-MeDeSA to
DDI alerts of Gopher 5.25. Their ratings were compared, and
Cohen’s k was calculated (k¼0.764, 95% CI 0.519 to 0.999). The
calculated k value indicates substantial agreement between
raters.
Correlation analysis
Preliminary evidence for construct validity was gathered
through a correlation analysis. Given that the usability of
medication-related decision support alerts has gained attention
only in recent years, we hypothesized that older systems would
perform more poorly than newer systems when DDI alerts are
evaluated by I-MeDeSA. DDI alerts from LMR (2010) and
Gopher (1993) were compared in order to establish a correlation
between system age and performance on I-MeDeSA. Analysis
Table 4 Description of drugedrug interaction alerts from three electronic medical records
Principle AiDKlinik Gopher Longitudinal Medical Record
Alarm
philosophy
Although no catalog is visible
for the user that explains in detail
the levels of severity, alerts are
color-coded and contain a brief
description to convey priority
Alerts are not stratified by levels of
severity
Although no catalog exists explaining the levels
of alert severity, alerts are color-coded to convey
priority
Placement Alerts are placed in order of severity
(from most severe to least severe top
to bottom); alerts appear upon selecting
the drug; the alert presents a description
of the potential adverse event (including
the mechanism of the interaction) and
its clinical management; the user must
scroll through the screen to see all alerts
Since alerts are not stratified by levels
of severity, alerts are not grouped
according to severity. As you place an
order for drug A, alerts appear for
interactions between current meds and
drug A. You will not, for example, see an
interaction for XeZ while you are placing
an order for drug A. The response to
the alert is located within the alert. The
alert clearly indicates the interacting drugs
and provides a link to additional information
on the interaction.
Alerts are stratified by three levels of severity;
responses are contained within the alerts with
the highest levels of severity (the least severe
alert is informational only); alerts appear as drugs
are ordered; interacting drugs are specified,
and clinical management and consequence
statements are conveyed within a total of
4.5 lines
Visibility Each alert is outlined in the color that
signifies the appropriate severity; the text
is blue on a white background; the font is
easily legible
The alerts appear on top of the ordering
screen; the area naming the interaction
displays yellow text is written on a blue
background, and the area displaying the
response is black text written on a gray
background; font is easily legible
Levels 1 and 2 alerts appear occupying the entire
screen, interrupting the user’s workflow; level 3
alert is informational and is found within the ordering
screen; for level 1 alert: blue text on pale red
background; for level 2 alert: black text on pale
yellow background; for level 3 alert: red text on
white background; font is easily legible
Prioritization Alerts are color-coded by severity (black,
red, orange, yellow, green, and purple);
signal words are used to convey the
severity of the alert; an exclamation point is
used for the highest level of severity, along
with color and a signal word; highest
severity alerts are located at the top of the
listed alerts
Neither color, signal words, nor shapes or
icons are used to signify the alert’s priority;
all alerts possess the same visual characteristics
and appear as drugs orders are placed
Level 1 alert is red; level 2 alert is orange; level 3
alert is red text incorporated into the ordering
screen; level 1 alerts labeled ‘Critical,’ level 2
alerts labeled ‘Warning,’ level 3 alert labeled ‘Alert;’
no shapes or icons are used to convey alert
priority; level 1 alerts appear first, followed by
level 2 alerts; level 3 alerts appear on the ordering
screen in a non-interruptive manner
Color Alerts are color-coded by severity, not
by the type of alert; no more than seven
colors are used for each alert
Color coding within the alert is not utilized in
any way; the alert utilizes no more than four
colors
Alerts are color-coded by severity, not by type; alerts
utilize no more than 10 colors
Learnability and
confusability
The highest severity alert possesses three
visual cues to convey its importance (color,
signal word, and a small icon), while lower
severity alerts use two visual cues (color
and signal word)
All alerts, regardless of severity, possess
the same visual characteristics
Alerts are color-coded by severity level: level 1 is
red, and level 2 is orange
Text-based
information
The alert displays a signal word indicating
its severity level; the interacting drugs are
specifically indicated; the effects of the
interaction and clinical management are
clearly and succinctly displayed
All alerts are labeled with ‘Warning;’ the
interacting drugs are specified; the user is able
to continue with the order, see more information
about interactions, or back out of the order; the
additional information succinctly presents the user
with the effect, mechanism, clinical significance,
and management of the interaction
Level 1 and 2 alerts are accompanied by a signal
word indicating priority level; interacting drugs are
specified, along with the effect of the interaction
and suggested clinical management, all within
4.5 lines
Proximity of
task components
being displayed
The user can access the drug monograph
through a button contained within each
alert
The user can link to outside sources of information
from elsewhere in the system when connected
to a workstation, but there is no link within the
alert
On the ordering screen, current interactions are
listed, along with a link to Micromedex for obtaining
additional information from an outside source
Corrective actions All alerts only present information, and no
alerts require action; the system is not capable
of ensuring that the user follows through with
the recommended clinical management
Directly from the alert, the user can choose to
continue with or cancel the order of the offending
drug; no other actionable options are available,
and the system is not capable of ensuring that the
user follows through with the recommended
clinical management
Actionable options within an alert depend on the
severity level; for level 1, the user is forced to
eliminate one of the offending drugs; for level 2,
the user may choose to discontinue the pre-existing
drug or continue with an order by providing an
over-ride reason; only for level 1 alerts is the system
able to ensure that the user follows through with the
recommended clinical management
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suggests a direct correlation between system age and perfor-
mance of DDI alerts on I-MeDeSA. LMR (2010) performed
better than Gopher (1993) (p¼0.0016). However, this is only
preliminary evidence for known group difference. A larger
sample size is necessary to determine a true correlation between
system age and performance of DDI alerts on I-MeDeSA.
DISCUSSION
Although there has been discussion surrounding the importance
of human factors in medication-related decision support, rela-
tively little empirical research has been done. The human-factors
studies in this domain have largely been qualitative, and
instruments to assess how human-factors principles have been
incorporated have not been widely available. Therefore, we
developed an instrument that evaluates the usability of DDI
alerts within medication-related decision-support systems,
combining previous research on human-factors principles with
current user feedback, thus making I-MeDeSA a novel tool.
Eight of the nine human-factors principles (Alarm Philosophy,
Placement, Visibility, Prioritization, Color, Learnability and Confus-
ability, Text-Based Information, and Proximity of Task Components
Being Displayed) selected for use in I-MeDeSA were originally
reported on in a study by Phansalkar et al,11 which compiled
information on human-factors principles and alert design and
display from a wide variety of robust sources. A ninth principle
was created from a combination of other items and user feed-
back collected in a related study.17 Twenty-six items were
created from the nine selected human-factors principles, and
preliminary evidence for the validity of the instrument was
gathered.
While the assessment of content validity and inter-rater reli-
ability were relatively straightforward, construct validation
proved to be quite challenging, given the limited number of
decision-support systems we could assess. Ideally, a larger
sample size of EMRs would allow performance of analyses to
assess the construct validity (eg, factor analysis) and internal
consistency reliability. However, factor analysis requires that we
test I-MeDeSA on two to 10 times as many systems as there are
items, that is, 52e260 decision-support systems. Additionally,
Cronbach’s a should have at least 20 observations per item in
order to produce a reliable assessment of internal consistency. As
part of a larger study, we have assessed the use of human-factors
principles in 14 medication decision-support systems (both
inpatient and outpatient) used throughout the USA.16 We felt it
would be inappropriate to test I-MeDeSA on all 14 systems.
Rather, we selected approximately 20% of the 14 systems as
representative examples to test the instrument.
To offer additional support for the validity of I-MeDeSA,
Seidling et al conﬁrmed that the display of an alert and the
textual information within are related to the user ’s acceptance
of an alert.19 Again, alert acceptance is deﬁned as the modiﬁca-
tion or cancelation of an order upon receiving an alert. The alert
display had an OR of 4.23 (95% CI 1.78 to 10.08, p¼0.0011) for
canceled orders versus over-ridden alerts, and an OR of 4.78 (95%
CI 4.63 to 4.93, p<0.0001) for modiﬁed orders versus over-ridden
alerts. The content of all nine items associated with alert display
can be found within I-MeDeSA. Textual information had an OR
of 1.22 (95% CI 1.15 to 1.30, p<0.0001) for modiﬁed orders
versus over-ridden alerts.
Our hope is that designers with little or no knowledge of
human-factors principles may use this instrument during early
stages of development to help construct highly usable DDI
alerts. We believe the instrument will be especially useful to
designers with little access to users who can test the product for
usability. Additionally, I-MeDeSA may assist institutions and
individual clinical practices in selecting a suitable medication-
related decision support vendor product.
I-MeDeSA has been tested on DDI alerts only and has not
been tested on other types of medication alerts, such as drug-
allergy alerts and drug-duplicate alerts. To continue increasing
the usability of medication-related decision-support systems and
enhancing patient safety, similar work should be carried out in
other areas.
LIMITATIONS
I-MeDeSA assesses the usability of DDI alerts used by outpa-
tient EMRs with medication-related decision-support function-
ality. While only three systems were used to test the
generalizability of I-MeDeSA, these three systems presented
a variety of DDI alert designs.
The scope of the study limited our evaluation to outpatient
EMRs, but we do think these ﬁndings are relevant to EMRs used
in inpatient care, as well as to other types of medication-related
decision support beyond DDIs. Future research will focus on
validating this instrument on EMRs used in different settings,
including inpatient and personal health records and other types
of medication decision-support alerts. Expansion of the number
of EMRs evaluated will also allow us to perform more stringent
analyses to support factor analysis or to obtain a reliable
assessment of internal consistency of the instrument.
CONCLUSIONS
We developed I-MeDeSA to assess the use of human-factors
principles in the design of DDI alerts. In the future, further
validation should be performed and I-MeDeSA’s use should be
evaluated for other types of decision support. We hope that
implementation of I-MeDeSA will assist in the system-devel-
opment process and increase the usability and effectiveness of
DDI alerts.
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